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U.S. v. PHILLIPSBURG NATIONAL BANK: A CONSIDERATION
OF COMMERCIAL BANKING AS THE RELEVANT LINE OF
COMMERCE IN SMALL BANK SITUATIONS
In December 1967, the Comptroller of the Currency, acting under
authority of the Bank Merger Act of 1966,1 approved the merger of
two direct competitors:2 the Phillipsburg National Bank and Trust
Company3 and the Second National Bank of Phillipsburg.4 Linked by
a bridge, Phillipsburg, New Jersey, and its neighbor, Easton, New
Jersey, constitute "one town"5 with a total population of 88,500. This
"one town" has seven commercial banks, four in Easton and three in
Phillipsburg, with a total of sixteen locations.' These seven banks fall
within the category of small banks,' their 1967 assets ranging from
$13,200,000 to $75,600,000.8 PNB and SNB were, respectively, the
third and fifth largest commercial banks in the "one town" and, upon
merger, would have produced a bank with assets of $41,100,000, second
in size of the remaining six commercial banks.'
Following the Comptroller's approval of the application, the Justice
Department brought suit under § 7 of the Clayton Act10 to enjoin the
merger. The federal district court, in United States v. Phillipsburg
1. 12 U.S.C. § 18(c) (7) (D) (1966). The Bank Merger Act of 1966 gives the
Comptroller of the Currency the power and responsibility of reviewing, denying, or approving merger applications of any federally insured bank if the acquiring, assuming, or
resulting bank is to be a national bank.
2. Where direct competitors are involved a question of horizontal mergers is presented. Such combinations, due to their actual elimination of competition are the most inherently dangerous of all mergers. See Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman
and Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285, 300
(Ja. 1967). The following discussion shall be limited to the question of horizontal
bank mergers.
3. Hereinafter cited as PNB.
4. Hereinafter cited as SNB.
5. United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank, 399 U.S. 350, 353 (1970).
It is interesting to note that in Phillipsburg alone there were three banks and a
population of 18,500. This figure increases to 28,500 when bordering suburbs are included.
6. Id. The sixteen locations constitute main offices and local branches.
7. Id. The Supreme Court gives no basis for this categorization of banks.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). Section 7, as amended, by the 1950 Celler-Kefauver
Anti-merger Act provides that:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or share capital, and no corporation subject to
the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
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National Bank," dismissed the complaint. On direct appeal, 2 the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded,"8 finding error in the district
court's determination that the relevant line of commerce included financial
institutions other than commercial banks. In addition, the Court found
the relevant geographic market to be Phillipsburg-Easton proper rather
than the much larger Lehigh Valley area as determined by the district
court.'4 The Supreme Court rested its decision upon standards developed
in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 5 the leading case
approving judicial application of § 7 of the Clayton Act to horizontal
bank mergers.' 6
Prior to PhiladelphiaBank it had been thought that bank mergers
7
were exempt from application of the Clayton ActY.1
In response to
11. 306 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.J. 1969). The District Court found inadequacy of loan
and trust service available in the community. The court held that even if there were de
minimis anticompetitive effects of the merger in the narrowly drawn market proposed by
the government, this was clearly outweighed by the convenience and needs of the community to be served by the merged bank. The court in analyzing the competition held
that attention must be directed to different groupings within the line of commerce. These
groupings separate those products and services where absence of competition might be
significant from those in which competition from many sources was so widespread that
no question of significant diminution of competition by merger could be raised. Competition in many of the services and products offered was so extensive and effective that
the merger created a larger bank, but did not create any possible deterimental effect
upon present competition, much less the imminent potential of ever increasing competition.
12. This appeal was taken under the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C., § 29 (1903).
13. 399 U.S. at 373.
14. The area chosen by the District Court was approximately four times as large
as Phillipsburg-Easton. The Lehigh Valley area had a 1960 population of 216,000 and
included 18 banks, whereas the Phillipsburg-Easton area had a population of only 90,000
served by seven banks.
15. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
16. Many cases have relied upon Philadelphia Bank. See, e.g., United States v.
First City Nat. Bank, 386 U.S- 361 (1967) ; United States v. First Nat. Bank, 376 U.S.
665 (1964) ; United States v. Third Nat. Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
17. Prior to the 1950 Celler-Keffauver Amendment, the language of the Clayton
Act had referred only to stock acquisitions. Since the majority of bank mergers did not
involve such acquisitions of stock, they did not fall within the control of the Act. The
1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton Act extended the coverage of that act
to acquisitions of assets. However, that amendment was limited to acquisitions of corporations under the control of the Federal Trade Commission. Since commercial banks
are under the control of the Federal Reserve Board and not the F.T.C., it was assumed
that banks were still exempt from prosecution under the Clayton Act. The Bank Merger
Act of 1960 was designed to establish an element of control over bank mergers. That Act
provided that before a merger could be consummated, it had to be approved by a specified
agency of the Federal government. It was assumed, however, that this approval, once
given, was to be final, and approved bank mergers would retain their exempt status as to
Section 7 prosecution. The Court in PhiladelphiaBank effectively held that even agency
approved mergers were subject to judicial scrutiny and the agency's determination was
not conclusive if the Court found the merger to be violative of the anti-trust laws.
In reaching this decision, the Court held that a bank merger was neither a pure stock
acquisition, as stipulated in the original language of the Clayton Act, nor a pure asset
acquisition, as stipulated in the 1950 Amendment. By reasoning that bank mergers fell
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PhiladelphiaBank's denial of that exemption , Congress enacted the Bank
Merger .Act of 1966.8 This Act prescribed standards and procedures
which federal agencies and courts were to apply in reviewing bank
merger applications. In addition, it established a "convenience and
needs" limitation to the Court's sweeping disapproval of mergers between
directly competing banks.19 In subsequent cases, however, the Supreme
Court has continued to rely upon Philadelphia Bank, thereby diluting
the "convenience and needs" limitation."
Prior to PhillipsburgBank, ten horizontal bank mergers had been
somewhere between these two standards and therefore were covered by their overlap, and
that the 1960 Bank Merger Act set standards by which bank mergers were to be judged,
thereby indicating a Congressional intent that they be so judged, the Court justified their
decision and their assumption of final determination which had previously been thought
to reside with the Federal agencies.
18. 12 U.S.C. § 18(c) (5) (1966). The essence of the 1966 Act is found in section
5: ... (5) The responsible agency shall not approve:
(A) any proposed merger which would result in a monopoly or which would be
in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize the business of
banking in any part of the United States, or
(B) any proposed merger transaction whose effect may be substantially to
lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner
would be in restraint of trade, unless it finds the anti-competitive effects of the
proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect.
19. Id. para. B.
20. The leading case interpreting the 1966 Bank Merger Act is United States v.
Third National Bank of Nashville, 390 U.S. 171 (1968). In that case, the Court rejected the argument that the 1966 Bank Merger Act had modified the usual anti-trust
analysis. The actual language of the 1966 Act omitted the phrase "any line of commerce." Line of commerce considerations had been important in Clayton Act suits since
the Court had interpreted the phrase to mean that potential anti-trust violations were to
be measured in light of the specific type of commerce which the concerned corporation
participated in. This interpretation effectively narrowed the relevant field of competitors
and magnified any anti-competitive effects due to the lessened number of individuals who
could supply effective competition. The omission from the 1966 Act raised speculation
whether Congress intended to expand the Supreme Court's definition of line of commerce
in bank merger cases. The PhiladelphiaBank case had held that commercial banking was
the relevant "line of commerce" and that no other non-bank financial institutions were to
be considered in the Court's determination of the anti-competitive effects of any proposed
merger. In the "NVashvilleBank case, the Court held that the sole function of the Act was
to excuse bank mergers which violate the anti-trust laws where the merging banks prove
that the benefits of the merger clearly outweigh the ill-effects of lessened competition.
The Court further stated, in a footnote, that they found no legislative intent to alter the
traditional methods of defining relevant markets. This seems to suggest that commercial
banking would still constitute a distinct line of commerce. The Court apparently determined that the omission of "any line of commerce" from the 1966 Bank Merger Act was
irrelevant.
In determining what would satisfy the convenience and needs limitation, the Court
in Nashville held that for an otherwise anti-competitive merger to be approved it had to
be shown that the merger was essential to gain the benefits for the "convenience and
needs" of the public. If these benefits could be gained in any other way, the merger was
not to be approved.
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contested under § 7 of the Clayton Act.2 The total assets of the proposed
banks in these cases ranged from a maximum of $6,001,888,000 to
a minimum of $389,700,000.22 The combined assets of PNB and SNB
would have been approximately one tenth the size of the smallest bank
merger previously contested. The PhillipsburgBank decision raises questions as to the suitability of the Court's line of commerce determinations
in small bank mergers.
Relevant Line of Commerce and Oligopoly Theory
The decisions in both Philadelphia Bank and Phillipsburg Bank
turned upon the selection of commercial banking as the relevant line of
commerce." Having narrowly drawn the market in both cases, the
Court applied oligopoly theory24 in determining that the mergers violated
§ 7 of the Clayton Act.
An analysis based upon oligopoly theory recognizes that oligopoly
power is inherently evil. Since concentrated market structure is the evil
rather than some particular conduct, any merger which might tend to
increase market concentration, and hence oligopoly power, is presumed to
be illegal. 5 Defining the relevant line of commerce thus becomes crucial.
21.

Contested section 7 bank merger cases: assets of resulting banks

Case
Millions
1. Manufacturers Hanover ........................................ $6,001.8

2. Continental Illinois ..........................................
3,248.3
3. Crocker-Citizens ..............................................
3,217.4
4. California Bank-First Westen ................................
2,421.2
5. Philadelphia National Bank ....................................
1,805.3
6. Provident-CentralPenn ........................................
1,069.1
7. First City-Southern National (Houston) ........................ 1,042.9
8. Mercantile Trust-Security Trust ................................
1,040.4
9. Third National-Nasheville Bank and Trust ......................
428.2
10. First National-Cooke Trust Company ..........................
389.7
11. Phillipsburg National-Second National ........................
41.1
22. See note 21 supra.
23. As a market is more narrowly drawn, the share of each competitor remaining
therein increases because of the decline in the total number of competitors. Therefore, a
a merger will cause a greater increase in concentration within a narrowly drawn market
than in one more loosely drawn.
24. See generally Brodley, supra note 2.
25. Id. at 350. The Court in Philadelphia Bank recognized this theory of presumptive illegality by stating:
we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be adjoined in the absence of evidence clearly
showing that the merger is not likely to have such anti-competitive effects.
374 U.S. at 363.
Justice White in United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 280 (1965),
found that a presumption of illegality arose when a proposed merger, (1) followed
a pattern of increasing competition; (2) eliminated a substantial competitor from the
market; (3) caused a significant percentage increase as a result of the merger; (4) was
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If it is defined such that the number of competitors is significantly
reduced, the possibility that a merger in that market will result in an
increase in concentration sufficient to fall within the presumptive illegality
of oligopoly theory is greatly enhanced.26
Moreover, utilization of oligopoly theory and the application of a
narrowly drawn line of commerce in Phillipsburg made the question of
the relevant geographic market insignificant. Had the Supreme Court
accepted the geographic market as defined by the district court, while
limiting the line of commerce to commercial banking, it is probable that
the merger would still have been enjoined. Within the geographic market
as determined by the lower court, the merged banks would have held
6.76% of the area's total commercial bank assets.2 7 This figure, though
relatively small when compared with the 36% in Philadelphia Bank28
and the 19.3% found in the Supreme Court's Phillipsburg-Easton 0
market, is well within the range of presumptive illegality under oligopoly
theory. In Brown Shoe v. United States"0 a market share of 5% was
declared to be presumptively illegal and in United States v. Von's
Grocery"' a 7.5% share was similarly proscribed. Furthermore, under
theories focusing upon total market concentration, the market structure
within the district court's relevant geographic area would also have been
proscribed. In light of the Bain theory, 2 the 73.85 % ' of the pre-merger
in an already oligopolistic market. Where there is such a situation, a merger involving
firms holding only relatively small market shares and resulting in only a slight increase
in market concentration is presumed illegal.
It can readily be seen that Philadelphia Bank phrases such as "undue percentage
share" and "significant increase" are readily adaptable to Justice White's requirements
for presumptive illegality.
See Brodley, supra note 2, at 309-310. Under such an oligopoly concentration
approach, the many persuasive defenses offered could have been rejected on the
ground that present evidence of market competitiveness is no basis for permitting
conversion of a market into an oligopoly. Present competitiveness provides no guarantee
of future competitiveness under more concentrated market conditions.
26. See notes 36 and 38 infra.
27. 306 F. Supp. at 659.
28. 374 U.S. at 331.
29. 399 U.S. at 355.
30. 370 U.S. 294, 343 (1961). While market percentages in Brownt Shoe varied
between sub-markets across the country, in 47 communities their share was 5% or less
which the Court held to constitute presumptive illegality.
31. 384 U.S. 270, 280 (1965).
32. See J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 530-31 (1959). A study by Professor
Bain has shown a strong positive correlation between concentrated oligopoly markets
and high profits. That study, covering profits in forty-two manufacturing industries
over a five-year period, indicated that where the largest eight firms in an industry
supplied seventy percent or more of the industry output, profits much higher than
average resulted. This pattern did not hold in less concentrated markets, thus suggesting
that there is a critical point at which a market becomes sufficiently concentrated to lead
to excess profits. Furthermore, where high entry barriers (as in a regulated industry)
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assets held by the eight largest banks reflects prima facie illegality.
Similarly, the 86.8% held by the twelve largest pre-merger firms 4 is
within the "loose oligopoly" considered likely to threaten competition
under the Kaysen-Turner theory."
In summary, the Court's acceptance of oligopoly theory as a mode of
analysis in situations similar to Phillipsburg renders the relevant line
of commerce determinative. Since the theory presumes slight increases in
market concentration to be illegal, it is essential that all effective competitors be included in the market.
Credibility of Commercial Banking as Relevant Line
of Commerce in Small Bank Situations
In PhillipsburgBank, as in PhiladelphiaBank, the Supreme Court
held that commercial banking constituted the relevant line of commerce,
and refused to include varying degrees of competiton from other types of
financial institutions. 8 The Court in Phillipsburg Bank reiterated the
reasons given in PhiladelphiaBank for its refusal to expand the line of
commerce beyond commercial banking. Justification for this refusal
centered upon two specific characteristics of commercial banking which
the Court deemed crucial in the defermination of the relevant line of
commerce. First, the Court placed reliance upon its finding that commercial banks offer certain unique services, particularly demand deposits,
were added to high seller-concentration, the profit rate tended to become even more
excessive.
33. 306 F. Supp. at 657.
34. Id.

35. C.

KAYSEN

and D. F. TURNER,

ANTITRUST

PoLicY 72 (1959). A tight oligopoly

is defined as a market in which eight or fewer firms supply 50% or more of the market
with the largest firm having 20% or more; a loose oligopoly, as a market in which
fewer than twenty firms control 75% of the market. The largest firm in the district
court's area controlled 18.96% of the total assets therein. See note 8 supra, at 656. Consequently, this market would appear to be very close to a tight oligopoly and definitely
constitutes a loose one.
36. United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank, 399 U.S. at 360; United States
v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 356. The district court in Phillipsburg
Bank, 306 F. Supp. 645, 647, 650, agreed that the term "commercial banking" may be
used as a general descripion of a line of commerce in bank merger cases. However,
the court there selected only those products and services, as the line of commerce, in
which the impact of the merger, if any, is likely to be felt. According to the district
court:
. . . while the term 'commercial banking' may be used to designate the
general line of commerce embracing all bank services, attention must be given
in analysis of competition to different groupings within the line of commerce
separating those products and services where absence of competition may be
significant from those in which competition from many sources is so widespread
that no question of significant diminution of competition by the merger could
be raised.
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for which they have no competition.37 Secondly, the Court found that
the "cluster of services""8 offered by commercial banks establishes a
decided customer preference for such banks. 9
It is questionable whether the unique services argument, as a basis
for limiting the relevant line of commerce to commercial banking, is
justifiable in small bank situations. Although it is generally true that no
other institution offers a service which can be considered an all inclusive
substitute for the checking account, there are an increasing number of
alternative means of performing the same financial function." Technology, especially in the form of electronics and computers, is providing
new means for settling account balances, making payments, and carrying
out money transfers. 4 The effect of such innovations upon the demand
deposit may be illustrated by the fact that statistical data, reflecting a
decline in the percentage of total bank assets derived from those deposits,
indicates a reduction in the value of offering this service.42 As a consequence, the growth of demand deposits in commercial banks has been
less than half the growth rate of the gross national product for almost any
time segment during the post-World War II period.4" Analyzing the
sources and uses of commercial bank funds during the 1956-1965 period,
one study shows that demand deposits accounted for only 20% of the
source of bank funds during the decade.44 In fact, demand deposits held
in the name of non-financial corporations4 5 declined during the decade
by $4.3 billions.4 This low growth rate of demand deposits is characteristic of a market declining as a result of product substitution. 7
37. 399 U.S. at 360, 374 U.S. at 356. "Demand deposits" here refers to checking
accounts.
38. 374 U.S. at 356. "Cluster of services" refers to the bank's offering a wide
range of services and products. It is argued that because banks offer all these services at
one location they enjoy a decided consumer preference.
39. Id. at 357.
40. Watson and Hoskins, "Line of Commerce" and Commercial Banking, 42 S.
CAL.L. REv. 225, 230 (1968-69).

41. Kramer and Livingston, Cashing in on the Checkless Society, 45 HAv. Bus.
Rxv. 141 (Sept.-Oct. 1967). Watson and Hoskins, supra note 40, at 230. These innovations range from telegraphic transfers and lock-box procedures to computer utilities,
the initial use of which has given rise to the prediction of a "checkless society." These
technological advantages have provided new ways of settling account balances.
42. See R. W. GOLDSMITH, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION S 79 (1968); Watson and
Hosldns, note 40 supra, at 230.

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. "Non-financial corporations" denotes corporations concerned with and participating in any business activity other than the financial market. This term excludes
financial institutions such as commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan
associations, finance companies, etc.
46. See note 42 supra.
47. Watson and Hoskins, supra note 40, at 230.
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The inappropriateness of the unique services rationale as a factor in
the line of commerce determination is reinforced by the nature of the
market in Phillipsburg when compared to that in Philadelphia Bank.
First, while in Philadelphia Bank the majority of the banks' business
was in products and services "unique" to commercial banking, such
"unique" services accounted for only a minority of the banks' business48 in
Phillipsburg Bank. 8 Thus, the Court has placed special emphasis upon
demand deposits, but has failed to consider that in Phillipsburg Bank
the percentage of demand deposits to total deposits was mucl lower than
in PhiladelphiaBank.49 Second, the Court failed to consider that in the
Phillipsburg-Easton market financial institutions other than commercial
banks did, in fact, accept demand deposits. For example, in Hudson
County National Bank v. Provident Institution for Savings0 the New
Jersey Supreme Court found that it had been the "usual custom of
savings banks" to maintain checking accounts, and that they could continue to do so.5 Finally, the Court's assertion, that the trust departments
and large commercial and industrial loans available at commercial banks
constitute unique services, 2 is not relevant to the Phillipsburg-Easton
market. The trust services offered by the banks in question are neither
efficient58 nor unique. 4 With respect to the large commercial and
48. 306 F. Supp. at 649.

Time and Savings Deposits, Deposits and Demand Deposits

As Percentage of Total Deposits

Time & Saving Demand

PNB
SNB
Girard

(Philadelphia Bank)

71%
72%

29%
28%

41%

59%

55%
45%
Large Bank Average
Percentage of Commercial and Industrial Loans of Total Loans
Girard
16.2%
PNB
12.3%
SNB

Real Estate Loans and Personal Loans as Percentage of Total Loans
Combined
Personal
Real Estate

Large Bank Average
PNB
SNB

14%
54%
72%

8%
28%
14%

22%
82%
86%

In addition, under 10% of PNB's assets were in industrial and commercial loans
and under 8% of SNB's as compared with 19.6% for all banks in the nation. On the
other hand, 33% of PNB's loans and 44% of SNB's loans were for real estate or
mortgages as compared with only 13% in the nation.

49. See note 48 supra.
50. 44 NJ. 282, 208 A2d 409 (1965).

51. Id. at 284, 208 A2d at 410.
52. 374 U.S. at 356.
53. 306 F. Supp. at 648.
54. The trust services offered by the Howard Savings Bank and others are

some of the best in the State of New Jersey and rival those offered by corn-
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industrial loans, the banks in question, because of their small percentage
of demand deposits, are unable to generate potential for expansion of such
long term loans.55 Therefore, it would appear that the "uniqueness" of
these services and the competitive advantage to be gained therefrom is
at best illusory in the Phillipsburg-Easton area.
As additional support for the "unique services" argument, the Court
in Philadelphia Bank and Phillipsburg Bank stated that certain commercial banking products and services enjoy "such cost advantages as to
be insulated within a broad range from substitutes furnished by other
institutions." 6 Emphasizing the lending market, the Court stated that
commercial banks were at a competitive advantage because the lending
capital of non-bank institutions consists "in substantial part of bank
loans." 5 If this were the case, commercial banks could effectively control
their competition through interest rates on loans to these other types of
financial institutions. However, it has been shown that, in fact, bank loans
comprise, on the average, only 16% of the lending capital of such
institutions.5" While a higher interest rate may be required on these
funds, it is doubtful whether the remaining 84% of the lending capital
of non-bank financial institutions would be similarly affected. Another
reason given for the competitive advantage of commercial banks was
that "only banks obtain the bulk of their working capital without having
to pay interest or comparable charges thereon, by virtue of their unique
power to accept demand deposits."5 Yet, in Phillipsburg Bank, the
merging banks obtained only 29% and 28% of their working capital,
respectively, from demand deposits.6" This does not constitute the "bulk
of their working capital." Furthermore, a recent study of all finance
mercial banks in the area. Brief for appellee at 30-31, United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank, 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
55. 306 F. Supp. at 648. The capacity of a commercial bank to generate credit to
meet the business needs of the community varies according to its demand deposits. It
seems that a high percentage of demand deposits and a high percentage of commercial
and industrial loans go hand in hand. The higher the volume of demand deposits, the
greater is the potential for expansion of credit in the form of commercial and industrial
loans. Accordingly, the quantity of funds that can be pumped back to meet the current
credit needs of the busines community is dependent upon the volume of demand deposits
which a bank holds.
56. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 356; United States
v. Phillipsburg National Bank, 399 U.S. at 361 n.4.
57. 374 U.S. at 356.
58. See Watson and Hoskins, supra note 40, at 231. The larger sales finance companies, having the greatest access to the commercial paper market, as of the end of 1965
obtained only 12% of their financing through bank loans. Personal finance companies
raised only 20% through commercial bank laons, while business finance companies
raised only 24% of their funds from this source.
59. 374 U.S. at 356 n.33.
60. See note 48 supra.
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companies revealed that personal finance companies obtained, on the
average, 21% of their funds without having to pay interest charges
thereon, and all finance companies obtained, on the average, 15%o of their
funds from interest free sources."' Thus, the interest-free capital obtained
by banks does not appear to give them the competitive advantage
indicated by the Court.
In excluding other financial institutions from the relevant line of
commerce, the Court has failed to consider recent undertakings by these
institutions which indicate that they are attempting to compete with
commercial banks. For example, savings and loan associations now
advertise interest rates to attract prospective customers. Finance companies have also established branches in retail outlets for greater consumer
convenience and in order to compete with branch banking.6" The effectiveness of this innovative competition is reflected in the substantial growth
rates and market shares of non-bank financial institutions when compared
to commercial banks. From 1955 to 1965, commercial banks grew at
a 5.8% compound rate, finance companies at an 8.5% rate and savings
and loan associations at a 13.1% rate. In 1966-1967, financial institutions
other than commercial banks accounted for over 50%o of the total volume
of consumer credit outstanding, and 57.6o of the home mortgage loans.
In terms of the total assets of financial intermediaries, the holdings of
commercial banks declined from 35.4%o in 1955 to 31.1% in 1965.6"
These statistics indicate that the offering of "unique" services by commercial banks has not prevented effective competition from other financial
institutions. "
The other factor which the Court found material to the definition of
the relevant line of commerce was the "cluster of services" offered by
commercial banks. According to the Court, this feature establishes a
decided customer preference for commercial banks. In Philadelphia
Bank the 'Court stated that as a result of offering a "cluster of services,"
commercial banks enjoyed a settled consumer preference as to savings
deposits, thereby insulating them from competition in that field.65
Although commercial banks in 1966 did hold 60%o of all savings deposits,
61. See R. W. GOLDSMITH, supra note 42, at 95, Table 3.10.
62. See Watson and Hoskins, supranote 40, at 233.
63. Id. at 238.
64. Furthermore, while these institutions may currently charge higher interest
rates than commercial banks, their financial structures in no way compel them to
charge such rates. Therefore, they are in no way prevented from lowering their rates
if they should so desire or circumstances should so motivate. Thus, they also provide
even more effective potential competition in the lending market.
65. 374 U.S. at 357.

66. See R. W. GOLDSmITH, supranote 42, at 89, Table 3.8.
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this is in large part attributable to the fact that they had three times as
many offices as savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks. 8
In addition, when the percentage of savings deposits held by commerical
banks is compared to the interest rate offered on such deposits it appears
that the current competitive position and market share of commercial
banks is more the function of competitive interest rates than of any
"settled consumer preference." In 1956 commercial banks held only
30% of such deposits. At that time, the interest rate paid by commercial
banks was less than 50% of that paid by savings institutions. 8 By 1966,
when commercial banks held 60% of all savings deposits, the rate paid
by commercial banks had tripled and was 90% of that paid by savings
institutions.6 Rather than enjoying a settled consumer preference, commercial banks have been forced to actively compete with non-bank institutions in the savings market.
The soundness of the "cluster of services" rationale is further
weakened by several important differences between the "cluster" offered
in PhiladelphiaBank and that available in Phillipsburg Bank. Whereas
the majority of the "cluster" in Philadelphia Bank was made up of
"unique" services, that in Phillipsburg Bank was made up primarily of
non-unique services.70 Furthermore, several of the "unique" services
relied upon by the Court in PhiladelphiaBank were either not available
in Phillipsburg-Easton or were not unique to commercial banks in that
market. 1
Such dissimilar conditions render questionable the Court's reliance
upon its findings in Philadelphia Bank as a basis for finding that the
"cluster of services" offered in Phillipsburg Bank creates a consumer
preference for commercial banks. One of the foundations of the Court's
"cluster of services" argument in PhiladelphiaBank was the determination that consumers, who were forced to patronize commercial banks in
order to utilize their unique services, were likely, as a matter of convenience, to utilize all of the banks' services. Since no unique services
were offered by the banks in Phillipsburg, there is little justification for
limiting the line of commerce on this basis. Even assuming that some
consumer preference does exist, the fact that there are no unique services
to compel a consumer to patronize a commercial bank would indicate
that less weight should be given the "cluster" argument than was accorded
it in PhiladelphiaBank.
67. Id.

68. Id. at 88.
69. Id. at 90.
70. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
71. See notes 50 and 54 supra.
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Because of the lack of "unique" services and the different nature of
the "cluster of services" in PhillipsburgBank, the merger of PNB and
SNB would have affected the same services, whether bank or non-bank
institutions were considered. Thus, any anti-competitive effects upon
rival commercial banks would have been felt to the same extent by nonbank financial institutions. As a result, there is no reason to limit the
relevant line of commerce to commercial banking in similar small bank
situations.
The importance of a realistic line of commerce determination is
enchanced when considered in light of the Court's holdings as to the
"convenience and needs" limitation of the Bank Merger Act of 1966.
The Act provides a means whereby an anti-competitive merger may be
permitted if the benefits derived therefrom, in terms of the "convenience
and needs" of the community, clearly outweigh the anti-competitive
effects.7 However, the Supreme Court's interpretation of this limitation
has made it difficult to meet. In United States v. Third National Bank of
Nashville,7 the Court held that proof was required that the "merger was
essential to secure this net gain to the public interest."7 4 If any other
means were available, without regard to their effectiveness or plausibility,
they must be pursued as far as possible before a merger could be approved. 5 In Phillipsburg Bank. the Court held that the benefits must
accrue to the entire market. The fact that there would be clear and substantial benefits to one segment thereof was insufficient."8
These standards virtually foreclose access to the "convenience and
needs" limitation. Therefore, once a merger is found to have substantial
anti-competitive effects, it will be prohibited. As a consequence, the
relevant line of commerce determination becomes the crucial issue.
Line of Commerce: An Ad Hoc Approach
The purpose of a line of commerce determination is to delineate the
group of competitors which may be adversely affected by a merger and
the products for which there are no effective substitutes. Just as Phillipsburg-Easton differed from Philadelphia, each market situation will vary
72. Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 18(c) (5) (B)

(1966). Section 18(c) (5) (B)

provides that a proposed merger whose effect may be to substantially lessen competition may still be approved if
The anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighted
in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the
convenience and needs of the community to be served.

73. 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
74. Id. at 189.
75. Id.

76. 399 U.S. at 370-72.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
with location, services offered, size of banks, non-bank competitors, and
existing technology. Thus, line of commerce determinations should be
made on an ad hoc basis, utilizing a rule of reason approach." The
problems inherent in forecasting competitive effects, which led to the
Court's adopting current oligopoly theory, are not present in line of
commerce determinations. An ad hoc approach to the relevant line of
commerce would be based upon readily available data pertaining to past
events and trends. It would involve no forecasting or involved economic
theory beyond the expertise of courts. Rather, the Court would focus
upon the actual market situation and the effective competiton therein.
Under such an approach the line of commerce in Phillipsburg Bank
should not have been limited to commercial banks but should have included those non-bank institutions with which the banks in question
actually competed. By restricting the line of commerce to commercial
banks, the Court ignored the reality of such banking in PhillipsburgEaston. By focusing on theoretical, though locally non-existent, characteristics of commercial banking, and excluding from the line of commerce institutions which provide totally effective competition, the Court
ignored the congressional concern which it noted in Brown Shoe."'
That congressional concern, in enacting § 7 of the Clayton Act, was the
protection of competition, not competitors."
JOHN D. BODINE
77. Such an approach calls for a case by case study and individual determinations
made for each different situation depending upon the nature of the particular market
involved. This rule of reason approach is the traditional method in Sherman Act cases.
78. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
79. Id. at 320.

